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We present a linear agent based model on brand competition. Each agent belongs to one
of the two brands and interacts with its nearest neighbors. In the process the agent can
decide to change to the other brand if the move is beneficial. The numerical simulations
show that the systems always condenses into a state when all agents belong to a single
brand. We study the condensation times for different parameters of the model and the
influence of different mechanisms to avoid condensation, like anti monopoly rules and
brand fidelity.
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1. Introduction
During the last few years a great amount of work from the physics community has
been devoted to the application of methods from statistical physics to the study of
economic problems, or econophysics 1,2,3,4. A wide range of problems have been
studied, for example, the shape of the distribution of price changes 5, theoretical
models of financial markets 6,7, portfolio selection and optimization 8,9, and wealth
distribution 10,11,12, to name just a few.
Here, our interest is the study, via Monte Carlo simulations on an agent based
model, of brand competition in a bipartite market. We present a very simple “toy”
model describing a situation where companies can choose one of two available brands
of a certain product or service. The decision of which of the two available options will
be selected by the company is based on a cost and payoff mechanism. It is assumed
that the product or service has a certain cost, and the company will obtain a benefit
or payoff from its use. The products are subject to technological innovation, and
1
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this innovation can persuade a company to switch to the competing brand. We also
explore the effect of anti monopolistic policies and brand fidelity.
2. The model
Consider a population of N agents that lie in a one-dimensional chain with periodic
boundary conditions. Only nearest-neighbor interactions are allowed to keep the
model as simple as possible. Each agent represents a company that uses some kind
of tool or service of a certain brand (i.e. Apple or PC computers, Citibank or Lloyd’s
financial services, etc.). It can be assumed that an agent will not switch to another
brand unless something is gained with the change, for example, a company may be
happy using Apple computers but, if a big improvement or technological advance
in PCs enters the market, then it may have a reason to switch computer brands.
In our model, we consider that only two different brands for a product or service
exist, say A and B. Agents are given initially one or the other brand at random.
Now suppose that a technological advance appears in one of the two brands, for
example in A. One of the agents using brand A will now have a better product,
and the neighbors of this agent may also want to switch to the new improved A
brand, however, this change will have an associated cost. This cost will depend on
whether the neighbor is also using brand A or is using the other brand. Typically
the cost of upgrading the same brand is less than the cost of changing to a different
brand. It may be the case that the neighbor does not want to change because the
technological improvement is too small to compensate for the cost of upgrading or
changing, and it may decide to wait for another version of the product to make the
change. If the neighbor decides to upgrade or change, then its own neighbor may
also want to do the same, and so on, until all agents change/upgrade or one decides
not to do so and the process stops. At this point a new improvement in one of
the brands enters the market and the process is repeated. The simulation therefore
proceeds as follows:
A set of N agents is created. Each agent is assigned at random a number that
identifies the brand that is using (0 or 1). The agent has also a real number T
assigned that is a measure of how new its product is. For example an agent with a
Pentium 4 computer will have a higher value of T than an agent with a Pentium 2.
A cost C of upgrading is defined, this cost applies when an agent wants to upgrade
to a new version of the same brand. Another cost S is defined that applies when an
agent wants to switch brands. Then:
(1) Randomly pick one of the agents, say agent i, and increase its technological
level T by a random amount δ between 0 and 1.
(2) For the neighbor i+1 calculate the quantity z = Ti−Ti+1− cost, where cost is
C if agents i and i+ 1 use the same brand, and S if they use different brands.
(3) If z > 0 then the gain in technological level is greater than the cost and the
agent i upgrades or changes. If z ≤ 0 then agent i stays with its brand and does
not upgrade nor change.
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(4) Repeat steps (2) and (3) for i+2, i+3, . . . until one of the agents has z < 0 in
which case the avalanche of upgrading/changing stops.
(5) Repeat steps (2) to (4) for neighbor i − 1.
(6) One time step has finished. Return to step (1).
The repetition of the above process N times constitutes one Monte Carlo simu-
lation (MCS), and its the unit of time. Note that an agent that upgrades or switches
will earn the quantity Ti − Ti+1 but it has to pay a cost C or S. Only when this
quantity is greater than the cost will the agent upgrade or switch. Therefore several
time steps may be necessary until the sufficient quantity accumulates to offset the
cost.
The simulation stops when all agents have the same brand. This phenomenon
of condensation is observed to happen for any set of model parameters. The con-
densation time may be small or large, depending on those parameters, but the end
result is always a single brand system. The brand that wins in the end is basically
the one that, by chance, starts growing earlier, initiating a positive-feedback effect.
The initial growth is generally triggered by a high technological innovation. This
condensation on one of two initially equivalent brands has also been observed in
previous works in economics 13, Ising models, and opinion dynamics 14.
3. Results
Condensation times depend on both the cost of upgrading C and the cost of switch-
ing S. In Fig. 1 we show the results for condensation time as function of the switching
cost. Each curve is for a different value of upgrading cost. As it can be seen, times
increase for higher values of the switching cost S. This is expected since more time
steps need to pass until the earnings are high enough to offset a high cost S. If we
increase the upgrading cost C, a similar curve is obtained, only with higher times.
The upgrading cost, unlike the switching cost, has a saturation value. That is, if
we increase C while keeping S fixed, the condensation time will stop increasing at
some point. This is due to the fact that if the upgrading cost is too high compared
to the switching cost, agents will prefer to switch their brand as soon as they can
(when one of its neighbors begin using a different brand). This is illustrated in Fig. 2
Since there is no preference for any of the brands, either one can dominate the
market with equal probability. As we said before, the process by which one of them
grows and eventually condensates is started by the formation of a cluster and the
eventual growth and coagulation with other same-brand clusters.
3.1. Anti monopolistic policies
Companies can grow too big if they are left free to develop in an unregulated market.
In order to prevent the formation of monopolies, several types of antitrust laws are
used. In our model, we introduce a simple antitrust rule: at each Monte Carlo step,
companies are counted and the upgrading cost of the larger company is increased in
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proportion to its size. For example, if the number of companies using product A is
larger than the number of those using B, then the upgrading cost C for companies
using product A is increased by a factor
f = 1 + k
(
NA
NB
− 1
)
, (1)
where Ni is the number of companies using product i and k is a parameter that
controls the intensity of the antitrust mechanism. In the above formula, f = 1 when
NA = NB, and increases linearly as NA/NB grows.
As it can be seen from the curves in Fig. 3, a higher value of the antitrust
parameter k extends the condensation time, however, it saturates at some value
of k, as shown in the inset. When k > 0, agents are penalized for upgrading their
brand, it becomes cheaper to switch, and this retards the condensation of the system.
However, there is a point when k is so high, that agents do not upgrade, they simply
stay with their old technology for very long time. At this point the value of k no
longer affects the dynamics, and we see the saturation shown in the inset. From a
practical point of view, this implies that an antitrust mechanism can be good at
preventing a monopoly but, if it gets too high, it will only retard the technological
innovations.
3.2. Brand fidelity
Another mechanism that can slow the condensation process is brand fidelity. A
company that is used to a certain product will be reluctant to change for several
reasons, for example, it will have to train the employees in the use of the new product
or service. There may be also concerns about the quality of customer service of the
new product, personal reasons, etc. All this ends up in that the company may have
a certain degree of fidelity for a particular product or service. This mechanism is
modeled introducing a modified switching cost:
S(y) = S +
y
1 + exp(−t/10)
−
y
2
, (2)
where t is the number of time steps that a company has been using a particular
brand, and y is a parameter that controls the degree of fidelity. In this way, the
cost of switching brands increases with time, up to an asintotic value y/2. Since as
time passes it becomes increasingly costly for a company to change its brand, this
mechanism implies a higher degree of fidelity for companies that have more time
using a brand. Note that when t = 0, Eq. (2) reduces to S(y) = S.
Figure 4 shows the results of this mechanism. Again we see that condensation
time increases with the fidelity parameter, in almost a linear fashion. The inset of
the figure shows that, unlike the antitrust parameter of the previous section, the
fidelity parameter can be augmented without saturation in the condensation time.
Of course, the extreme case when a company is completely faithful to a brand will
make the condensation time to diverge, therefore no saturation is expected in this
parameter.
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4. Conclusions
We have studied a model of brand competition in the simplest case of two brands
and nearest-neighbor one-dimensional dynamics. It is found that the system always
reaches a condensed state where a single brand dominates the market. This state
is reached despite the introduction of mechanisms to avoid it, like anti monopoly
rules and fidelity to the brand behavior. These mechanisms succeed in delaying the
condensation but do not prevent it. The final single-brand state cannot be avoided
and the system is doomed to become a monopoly. We have cited results from other
authors 13,14 that show a similar behavior, even in more than one dimension. In
the Sznajd model of opinion dynamics for example, condensation appears in all
dimensions. Our future work will therefore extend the present model to include
multi-brand and two-dimensional situations.
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Fig. 1. Condensation time is plotted against the switching cost S. Each curve is for a different
upgrading cost C which, from bottom to top are C = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Each point in the curves is
averaged over at least 2500 independent realizations.
Fig. 2. Condensation time is plotted against the upgrading cost C. Each curve is for a different
switching cost S which, from bottom to top are S = 0.0, 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, 1.4. Each point in the curves
is averaged over at least 2500 independent realizations.
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Fig. 3. Condensation time against the switching cost S for a fixed value of upgrading cost C =
1. Each curve is for a different value of the parameter k which, from bottom to top are k =
0, 0.1, 0.2, 1, 10. The inset shows the condensation time as function of k for a fixed value of S = 6,
with the lower curve corresponds to a value of C = 1 and the upper curve is for C = 2. Each point
is averaged over at least 2500 independent realizations.
Fig. 4. Condensation time against the switching cost S for a fixed value of upgrading cost C =
1. Each curve is for a different value of the parameter y which, from bottom to top are y =
2, 5, 10, 15, 20. The inset shows the condensation time as function of y for a fixed value of S = 6,
with the lower curve corresponds to a value of C = 1 and the upper curve is for C = 2. Each point
is averaged over at least 2500 independent realizations.
